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Abstract 
Spencer, Lauren A., M.S. The University of Memphis. August 2014. The effect of 
evaluator reputation on feedback acceptance. Major Professor: Jeffrey S. Berman, Ph.D. 
This experiment examined whether acceptance of feedback is affected by evaluator 
reputation, defined as the feedback recipient’s perception of the source as a generally easy 
versus hard evaluator. It was hypothesized that when feedback valence was inconsistent 
with the evaluator’s reputation concerning feedback, feedback would have a greater effect 
on the recipient’s self-perceptions, and secondarily, that feedback acceptance would 
depend on self-esteem level. Participants received false feedback on their levels of social 
awareness after completing a task and being told that the experimenter was either a hard 
or easy evaluator. Participants then provided post-feedback ratings of self-perceived 
social awareness. Results did not support the hypotheses, but instead suggested that 
feedback from an easy evaluator had a greater effect on participant self-perceptions than 
feedback from a hard evaluator. These findings add to our understanding of self-concept 
change, and may have implications in the fields of organizational psychology, academics, 
and sports psychology. 
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People use evaluative information that they receive from others to form their own 
self-perceptions and self-evaluations (Baumeister, 1998). This information is often 
obtained when one individual evaluates another individual in a certain domain based on 
performance or some other type of behavior. Evaluation by a college instructor or work 
supervisor are common examples. In some cases, the recipient of feedback will adjust 
self-perceptions in accordance with feedback (Binderman, Fretz, Scott, & Abrams, 1972; 
Harvey & Clapp, 1965), which is referred to as feedback acceptance, and many factors 
have been found to determine the degree to which feedback acceptance occurs. For 
example, past research has shown that people are more likely to accept feedback that is 
positive (Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel, & Houston, 1976; Lundgren, Sampson, and Cahoon, 
1998; Snyder & Cowles, 1979), consistent with initial self-perceptions (Shrauger, 1975), 
from a source perceived as credible (Binderman et al., 1972; Halperin et al., 1976; 
Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1999; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993) or from a source with whom 
they have a close relationship (Lundgren & Rudawsky, 1998). Additionally, self-esteem 
moderates the relationship between many of these variables and feedback acceptance 
(Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970; Stotland, Thorley, Thomas, Cohen, & Zander, 1957; 
Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1999). The present study examined the primary 
hypothesis that the reputation of an evaluator regarding feedback affects feedback 
acceptance. Reputation refers to the general perceptions by others of the evaluator’s 
tendency to give feedback that is either positive or negative. Specifically, it was proposed 
that feedback that was inconsistent with the reputation of an evaluator would influence 
the recipient’s self-perceptions more than consistent feedback. A secondary hypothesis 
was that the effects of source reputation on feedback acceptance would depend on self-
esteem level. 
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People seek out knowledge about themselves (Baumeister, 1999). However, people 
are also driven by internal needs that result in biases in processing that information. A 
basic understanding of how self-relevant information is processed is fundamental to 
understanding how self-perceptions change based on feedback as well as why processing 
of this information is likely to be biased.  
Two very similar theories view information processing as occurring through two 
pathways. The elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Wegener, 1998) and the heuristic-
systematic model (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) are referred to as dual-mode 
processing models. According to both of these theories, there are two routes by which 
information is processed: one that requires a large amount of effort and carefully 
examines information (central route or systematic processing), and another that is based 
on heuristics, or mental shortcuts, and requires less effort (peripheral route or heuristic 
processing). 
The processing pathway used depends on the availability of motivation and ability to 
process information (Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). Motivation to process 
information might be low if the topic seems uninteresting or irrelevant, or if the person 
processing the information feels that his attitude toward the topic is of little importance. 
The ability to process information may be lacking when people are very distracted or if 
they do not have enough prerequisite knowledge to process the incoming information. 
Certain factors, including framing a message in an unexpected way, or including key 
phrases that reference broad sets of values, tend to increase systematic processing (Petty 
et al., 1997).  
Based on these two requirements for systematic processing, it is reasonable to expect 
that self-relevant information will almost always be processed systematically. Motivation 
to process such information should be high, since self-interest is a large determining 
factor of an issue’s importance (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995; Petty, Cacioppo, & 
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Haugtvedt, 1992). Additionally, one should be highly able to process self-relevant 
information, because prerequisite knowledge of the topic should be abundant. Research 
supports this idea that self-relevance increases systematic processing (Turco, 1996) and 
has linked the use of self-relevance in processing of personal information to more 
powerful encoding and better memory of that information (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 
1999). Systematic processing is likely to result in biased processing (Petty et al., 1997). It 
has also been found that possession of knowledge relevant to the attitude can result in 
biased information processing (Biek, Wood, & Chaiken, 1996). When the topic is 
oneself, it can surely be said that one possesses a great deal of relevant knowledge. So, 
from an information processing perspective, people are highly motivated and equipped to 
process and understand self-relevant information. Therefore, self-relevant evaluative 
feedback would be expected to be processed systematically and with bias. 
Two motives have been identified that can bias the processing of self-relevant 
information: self-enhancement (Baumeister, 1998) and self-verification (Swann, 1987). 
Self-enhancement is the need to view oneself positively. People generally seek and accept 
feedback that allows them to feel good about themselves, resulting in a bias toward 
positive feedback (Baumeister, 1998). Self-verification is the need for consistency within 
the self-concept (Swann, 1987). Because of this motive, information that agrees with the 
current view of the self is more easily accepted than information that conflicts with it. In 
many instances, positive feedback satisfies the needs for both enhancement and 
verification. However, there are also times when positive feedback may be inconsistent 
with one’s self-concept. 
In people with low self-esteem, there can exist a conflict in motives called cognitive-
affective crossfire (Swann et al., 1999). Individuals with low self-esteem have a relatively 
less positive view of themselves, so that negative self-relevant information may fulfill the 
need for self-verification, whereas positive self-relevant information fulfills the need for 
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self-enhancement. So, for people low in self-esteem, these two motives can be at odds. 
This was exemplified in a study in which people with high and low self-esteem were 
given either positive or negative feedback on a social sensitivity task and changes in their 
perceived social sensitivity were measured (Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970). Self-
perceptions of high self-esteem participants in that domain rose if they were given 
positive feedback but did not change if they received negative feedback. Low self-esteem 
participants lowered their self-perceptions of social sensitivity when given negative 
feedback, but did not change them when given positive feedback. This indicates that 
feedback consistent with self-esteem level is accepted, and inconsistent feedback is 
rejected. 
Research has also shown that high and low self-esteem individuals react differently 
to social input in other ways that are pertinent to the topic of this investigation. People 
with low self-esteem have been shown to be more susceptible to persuasion than high 
self-esteem individuals (Janis, 1954). Compared to those with high self-esteem, people 
with low self-esteem are more affected by negative feedback and less affected by positive 
feedback, even when they have comparable starting self-perceptions prior to feedback 
(Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1999). Additionally, people with low self-esteem are more 
distressed by failure than high self-esteem people (Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989). 
Another way that self-esteem affects reactions to feedback is through expectations. 
Initial self-perceptions or self-esteem might be the basis for expectations of how one will 
perform, and for the feedback expected. For example, people who have low self-esteem 
are more likely to perceive themselves as less capable of earning positive feedback than 
people with high self-esteem, and therefore might expect negative feedback, and be 
surprised by positive feedback (Schrauger, 1975). It has also been demonstrated that 
subjects who are high in self-efficacy for a task (they expect to do well) tend to rate 
positive feedback as more accurate than negative feedback, and people low in self-
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efficacy find positive feedback to be less accurate (Alden, 1986). In another study, 
subjects who expected positive feedback were given feedback that was even more 
positive than they expected, and people expecting negative feedback were given feedback 
that was even more negative than expected (Harvey & Clapp, 1965). Both of these groups 
that received feedback that was consistent with expectations changed their self-
evaluations in the direction of the feedback, while subjects whose self-perceptions and 
feedback were in opposite directions did not show a change. In the present study, global 
self-esteem rather than self-esteem specific to social awareness was used to represent 
existing self-views given the considerable literature on the role global self-esteem plays in 
feedback acceptance. Like self-esteem level and existing self-perceptions, perceptions of 
the evaluator as easy or hard might affect feedback acceptance by influencing recipient 
expectations. 
Attribution theory is key to understanding many of the strategies people use to bias 
information processing to fulfill the needs for self-enhancement and self-verification. 
When people receive evaluative feedback, they attempt to explain the cause of that 
outcome (Weiner, 1985). A crucial determinant of reactions to feedback is whether that 
cause is perceived to be an aspect of the self (e.g., effort, intelligence, ability) or an aspect 
of the situation (e.g., very critical evaluator, luck). These perceived causes are called 
attributions. Weiner (1985, 1986) proposed three main factors in describing attributions: 
locus of causality (internal or external), controllability (controllable or uncontrollable), 
and stability (stable or unstable). For example, if a person receives negative feedback on a 
quiz that was taken during a period of sickness, attributions for that bad grade would 
probably be external (the flu), uncontrollable (can’t help getting sick), and unstable (will 
feel better for future quizzes). People often meet enhancement and verification needs by 
making self-serving attributions.  
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Generally, people tend to accept responsibility for good outcomes and deny 
responsibility for bad ones (Johnston & Nawrocki, 1967; Sicoly & Ross, 1977) to meet 
self-enhancement needs. However, because the need for verification is often in conflict 
with the need for enhancement in people with low self-esteem, self-esteem level also 
influences attributions. Self-esteem has repeatedly been shown to predict emotional 
(Brown & Dutton, 1995; Dutton & Brown, 1997), cognitive, (Shrauger & Rosenberg, 
1970), and behavioral (Silverman, 1964) responses to feedback. People with high self-
esteem are especially able to satisfy the need for self-enhancement by interpreting events 
in ways that protect or increase their self-esteem (Brown, 1993; Shrauger, 1975). One 
way they do this is by questioning the credibility of the source of negative feedback 
(Markus, 1977) including both the task or test that is given (Crary 1966; Shrauger, 1975) 
and the human evaluator (Shrauger & Lund, 1975). In contrast, people who have low self-
esteem are inclined to make internal attributions for negative feedback (Fitch, 1970). In 
addition to consistency with self-esteem level, consistency of feedback with expectations 
and initial domain-specific self-perceptions can also be achieved through self-serving 
attributions. Feedback inconsistent with expectations (Alden, 1986; Feather, 1969) or 
existing self-perceptions (Crary, 1966) tends to be externally attributed to characteristics 
of the evaluator or task, thereby decreasing its influence on self-perceptions. 
Two final theories guide the present hypothesis. Adaptation-level theory (Helson, 
1964) posits that judgment of a stimulus is not isolated. Instead, it depends on an 
adaptation level that is established by the group to which the stimulus belongs. Judgments 
are made by comparing a stimulus to what is considered normal for that class. According 
to adaptation-level theory, in an evaluative feedback relationship, the adaptation levels of 
recipients for their own feedback is determined by knowledge they have about feedback 
that has been given to others. Therefore, participant reactions to the feedback they receive 
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might depend on the adaptation level that is established in part by knowledge of an 
evaluator’s reputation. 
Similarly, social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) states that people compare 
themselves to others to make self-evaluations, and comparing oneself to someone 
perceived as better will negatively impact self-evaluations, whereas comparing oneself to 
another perceived as worse results in more positive self-evaluations. This is known as a 
contrast effect, meaning that contrasting one’s current self-perceptions with perceptions 
of others results in a movement away from one’s initial self-perception in the opposite 
direction of the perception of others. Contrast effects are strongest when people are 
unsure of their own self-perceptions and assimilation effects can occur if they are 
relatively certain in their self-views (Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995). Together, adaptation-
level theory and social comparison theory predict that knowledge of evaluations given to 
others will affect one’s reaction to his own feedback. 
The goal of this study was to examine the effect of evaluator reputation on feedback 
recipient self-perceptions, and the roles played by feedback valence and self-esteem. 
Participants high or low in self-esteem were given either positive or negative feedback on 
a task by an evaluator with the reputation of being either easy or hard. Following 
feedback, self-perceptions in the domain related to the task (social awareness) were 
assessed. It was hypothesized that evaluator reputation would interact with feedback 
valence and self-esteem to determine the amount of change that occurred in self-
perceptions of social awareness. Feedback that was inconsistent with the evaluator’s 
reputation was expected to affect self-perceptions more than feedback consistent with the 
evaluator’s reputation. Additionally, feedback that was in agreement with self-esteem 





Participants were 113 undergraduate students at a large metropolitan university. The 
sample was 76.1% female, and 50.4% African American, 44.2% White, 3.5% Native 
American/Alaska Native, 2.7% Asian, 0.9% Hispanic, and 4.4% other. Participants 
ranged from 18 to 50 years of age (M = 22, SD = 5.1). Participants were recruited via an 
online participant recruitment system and from classes whose instructors allowed the 
experimenter to announce the study during class. They received course or extra credit for 
participating. These participants were selected from a total of 165 individuals because 
they scored at or above the 66.67 percentile score or at or below the 33.33 percentile 
score on a prescreen of self-esteem level. Individuals in the middle range of self-esteem 
were excluded to increase the ability to detect the hypothesized linear effect of self-
esteem. 
Procedure 
The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the university’s Institutional 
Review Board (see Appendix 1). Prior to the experimental session, participants took the 
measures of self-esteem and self-perceived social awareness as pretests to qualify for 
participation in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 
easy evaluator/positive feedback, easy evaluator/negative feedback, hard 
evaluator/positive feedback, or hard evaluator/negative feedback. When participants 
arrived, they were assigned an envelope designating their condition; however, the 
researcher and research assistant remained blind to the condition until immediately prior 
to delivering their respective manipulations. They also remained unaware of which 
manipulations the other gave. This ensured that participants were not treated 
systematically differently prior to the manipulations due to experimenter expectancies. 
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The topic of the experiment presented to participants when they signed up for this 
study was “Social Awareness in College Students.” Participants reported to the lab 
individually and were greeted by a research assistant. The research assistant briefly 
introduced the participant to the experimenter and told the participant that the 
experimenter would be evaluating them. The research assistant and participant entered a 
smaller room, where the research assistant closed the door and obtained consent to 
participate (see Appendix 2). After setting up an online survey system, the research 
assistant explained that the participant would be completing a social awareness task 
which would measure awareness of the feelings and emotions of others. Participants were 
told that their responses would be evaluated by the experimenter, who would tell them 
how they did and explain the results. Participants were left alone to complete the task, 
and were instructed to notify the research assistant when they finished. 
The social awareness task was designed by the researcher for the purposes of this 
study to be a believable measure of social awareness to participants (see Appendix 3). 
Three images of people were presented onscreen, and participants were asked to write a 
story about what those people were thinking and feeling and what was happening in the 
situation. Images were in black and white and depicted people in ambiguous situations to 
allow for many different interpretations. The first image was of a woman and man staring 
off in different directions, the second was of several men congregating in a parking 
garage, and the third showed a woman holding an umbrella looking at a train. Participants 
were given four minutes to write each story. Responses to the social awareness task were 
not actually read by the experimenter during the procedure because feedback valence was 
randomly determined; however, subsequent examination of responses confirmed that all 
participants followed directions on the task.  
When the participant reported to the assistant that the task was complete, the 
research assistant walked with the participant back into the testing room, ostensibly to 
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send the participant’s responses on the social awareness task to the experimenter, and 
closed the door. While pretending to send the results, the research assistant told the 
participant that their responses were being sent to the experimenter so the participant 
could be evaluated. For participants in the negative source condition, the assistant 
lowered her voice and casually mentioned that the experimenter was a really harsh 
evaluator, and everyone so far had received a really bad evaluation. In the positive source 
condition, the assistant said in a lowered voice that the evaluator was a really easy 
evaluator, and everyone so far had received a really good evaluation. The assistant then 
told the participant that the experimenter would read and evaluate the participant’s 
responses and would come speak to them in a few minutes. 
After approximately 4 min, the experimenter entered the testing room to deliver 
either positive or negative feedback (see Appendix 4). For participants assigned to the 
positive feedback condition, the experimenter told them that she saw them as very high in 
social awareness and rated them a 9.7 out of 10. She explained that they were very 
attuned to the feelings of others and were consequently better at building and maintaining 
relationships than many people. In the negative feedback condition, participants were told 
that they were very low in social awareness and received a 4.3 out of 10. The 
experimenter told them that they were not very attuned to the feelings of others and were 
not as good as many people at building and maintaining relationships. 
The experimenter then told the participant that the research assistant would set them 
up for a final survey, after which the study would be complete. The experimenter left the 
room, and the research assistant started the survey program. This final survey included the 
self-perception measure and manipulation check survey.  
After all measures were complete, participants were debriefed extensively (see 
Appendix 5). Participants were asked questions to probe for suspicion, and the rationale 
for the study was explained. The experimenter assured all participants that the social 
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awareness task was fake, and that feedback was in no way based on their performance on 
the task or their social awareness, but was randomly assigned. They were told that the 
comments made by the research assistant about the experimenter were also randomly 
determined, and that the entire situation was carefully constructed to seem real, because 
when people know what a researcher is looking for, they tend to behave differently. The 
experimenter asked the participant not to reveal this information to others who may 
become participants. The participant was given the opportunity to ask questions, and the 
experimenter looked for signs that participants, especially those who received negative 
feedback, were upset. Participants were given the debriefing form, which included 
information for campus psychological and counseling resources in case they became 
distressed later. They were also invited to contact the researcher if any future questions 
arose, or if they would like information on the findings from the study. 
Measures 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. This 10-item self-report scale assessed global self-
esteem (Rosenberg, 1965; see Appendix 6). Sample items included, “At times I think I 
am no good at all,” and, “I feel that I have a number of good qualities.” Response options 
were strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree, with some items reverse-
coded. Internal consistency reliability in the United States has been found to be good, 
with a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). 
Self-Perception Measure. This self-report measure contained six items used to 
assess self-perceptions of social awareness and fourteen distractor items. Because no 
scales existed that measured social awareness as defined in this study, this measure was 
specifically created to assess self-perceptions in the feedback domain (see Appendix 7). A 
sample item is, “I can sense how others feel.” Responses were scored on a 10-point scale, 
with labels of completely false (1), somewhat false (4), somewhat true (7), and completely 
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true (10). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .92, indicating excellent internal 
consistency. 
Manipulation Check Survey. A manipulation check survey was included to assess 
the degree to which manipulations of perceived evaluator reputation and feedback 
valence were successful (see Appendix 8). One item asked participants to rate their 
evaluator on a 10-point scale ranging from hard judge to easy judge. Another item asked 
participants to indicate how positive or negative their feedback was on a similar scale 
ranging from extremely negative to extremely positive. Participants were also asked to 
report the percentage of people they thought scored lower than them.  
Preliminary Analyses of Manipulations 
Analysis indicated that the evaluator reputation manipulation delivered by the 
research assistant affected participant ratings of the evaluator, with the evaluator in the 
easy evaluator condition rated higher (M = 6.6) than in the hard evaluator condition (M = 
4.7), F(1, 111) = 16.19, p < .001. Analysis also indicated that participants rated their 
feedback more positively in the positive feedback condition (M = 9.7) than in the negative 
feedback condition (M = 4.0), F(1, 111) = 348.90, p < .001. When participants were 
asked what percentage of people they thought scored lower than them, participants who 
received positive feedback reported a higher percentage (M = 53.8) than the percentage 
reported by participants in the negative feedback condition (M = 23.6), F(1, 111) = 62.64, 




Participant self-ratings of social awareness were analyzed using a 2 (evaluator) × 2 
(feedback) × 2 (self-esteem) analysis of variance with pretest scores on self-rated social 
awareness as a covariate. Analysis indicated that the effect of the evaluator’s reputation 
depended on whether the feedback was positive or negative, Evaluator × Feedback F(1, 
104) = 3.79, p = .05. As Figure 1 illustrates, when the feedback was positive, participants 
had higher self-ratings with an easy evaluator (adj M = 8.5) than with a hard evaluator 
(adj M = 8.1), F(1, 104) = 1.41, p = .2. On the other hand, when the feedback was 
negative, participants had lower self-ratings with an easy evaluator (adj M = 6.4) than 




Figure 1. The interaction of evaluator reputation and feedback 




The effects of this interaction did not vary reliably based on self-esteem level, 
Evaluator × Feedback × Self-Esteem F(1, 104) = 1.38, p = .2, nor was there a statistically 
significant main effect of self-esteem level on self-rated social awareness F(1, 104) = 
.001, p > .9. Analyses using self-esteem cut-points other than the top and bottom thirds 
resulted in the same findings. Additionally, pretest scores did not interact reliably with 
any other factors, suggesting that effects of evaluator reputation on feedback acceptance 





Results did not support the primary hypothesis that feedback that was inconsistent 
with evaluator reputation would have a greater effect on participant self-perceptions than 
feedback from a consistent evaluator. It was also hypothesized that the effects of feedback 
would depend on participant self-esteem levels, and results did not provide support for 
this hypothesis. Findings do, however, suggest a different relationship between feedback 
valence and evaluator reputation.  
In this study, evaluator reputation and feedback valence interacted in their effects on 
self-perceptions. Participants who perceived their evaluator as easy tended to change their 
self-perceptions in the direction of feedback more than the group with a hard evaluator. 
Three possible explanations for this finding are offered. 
First, it may be that people who perceived the evaluator to be easy perceived the 
evaluator in a generally more positive light (e.g., more likable) and, therefore, cared more 
about their evaluation. People tend to hold stereotypes that cause them to assume that if a 
person possesses one trait, they also possess other traits. This tendency has been labeled 
with such terms as the halo effect or correlational bias (e.g., Berman & Kenny, 1976; 
Cooper, 1981; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). For instance, if someone is perceived to be 
friendly, this might result in them also being perceived as intelligent, trustworthy, and 
loyal. Evaluators who are believed to give positive feedback may also be seen as 
possessing other positive traits that might result in greater feedback acceptance. 
Evaluators believed to give negative feedback may be seen as having other undesirable 
traits which may result in the discounting of their feedback. Studies have found that when 
the source of feedback (Binderman et al., 1972; Halperin et al., 1976; Shrauger & 
Schoeneman, 1999) or persuasive communication (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978; Hovland 
& Weiss, 1951; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993) is seen as more credible, the feedback or 
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message has a greater effect on the target. Credibility has most often been defined as 
including characteristics such as expertise, status, and trustworthiness. Perhaps through 
halo effects, evaluator reputation affects perceptions of source credibility and/or global 
perceptions of the evaluator as positive or negative, resulting in feedback from an easy 
evaluator being given more weight than feedback from a harsh evaluator. Indeed, Keeley, 
English, Irons, and Henslee (2013) found evidence that the halo effect was at play in 
teacher evaluations. When certain characteristics of teachers were manipulated, 
participants shifted their ratings of the teachers overall and on seemingly unrelated 
characteristics in the same direction. Future research might attempt to replicate and 
extend results of the current study by measuring credibility along with perceptions of the 
evaluator on other dimensions to see whether this halo effect explanation is supported. 
A second interpretation might be that, when feedback was negative, participants 
were affected by evaluator reputation in a pattern consistent with the primary hypothesis. 
They were more affected by negative feedback from an easy (inconsistent) judge than 
feedback from a hard (consistent) judge. However, because positive feedback is the social 
norm and there are often social sanctions associated with conveying negative evaluations 
of others (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1999), participants in the positive feedback condition 
may have doubted the veracity of their feedback. Therefore, they may have needed to 
utilize source cues to determine whether they should accept their feedback. In this case, 
people may have discounted the feedback from the hard source because they suspected 
that it was insincere. 
A third possibility is that this finding happened by chance. It could be that this 
pattern occurred in the sample used in this experiment, but would not occur in other 
samples. Replication in future research would clarify whether the effect found in this 
study is reliable. 
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Interestingly, and contrary to the original hypothesis, self-esteem level did not 
statistically significantly interact with evaluator reputation or feedback valence. It was 
thought that self-esteem level would be important in this relationship because participants 
with low self-esteem would experience a conflict between the goals of self-enhancement 
and self-verification. This effect has been demonstrated in past research (Shrauger & 
Rosenberg, 1970; Stotland et al., 1957; Swann et al., 1999). However, low self-esteem 
reflects a relatively less positive, but not necessarily negative, self-view. Low scores on 
self-esteem measures usually reflect responses that are neutral but not necessarily 
negative, and few people score lower than the conceptual average on self-esteem 
measures (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). Thus, the low self-esteem group, while 
possessing relatively less positive self-views than the high self-esteem group, may not 
have held negative self-views. This would mean that the need for self-verification may 
not have conflicted with the need for self-enhancement, and participants responded 
similarly to feedback regardless of self-esteem scores. Additionally, Baumeister et al. 
(1989) have suggested that self-esteem scales measure a self-presentational orientation, 
and that self-presentation may account for some behavioral findings from past research 
based on self-esteem scales. Whereas people who score high on self-esteem scales tend to 
call attention to themselves and exhibit a self-enhancing presentation style, people with 
low self-esteem scores tend to avoid drawing attention and have a protective self-
presentation style (Baumeister et al., 1989). It is perhaps possible that, had feedback been 
given in front of a group instead of one-on-one, differences between self-esteem groups 
may have been observed. 
It should be noted that, although this experiment successfully manipulated perceived 
evaluator reputation, which was the construct of interest, it did not differentiate between 
more specific constructs that evaluator reputation encompasses. Future studies might be 
able to separately manipulate participant expectations, perceptions of the evaluator’s 
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standards, or social comparison processes activated by perceptions of evaluator reputation 
to elucidate how evaluator reputation influences recipient self-perceptions. For example, 
feedback that is inconsistent with expectations is more likely to be attributed to external 
versus internal causes (Alden, 1986; Feather, 1969), but it is not known what effect 
evaluator reputation has over and above effects produced by the simple expectation of a 
certain type of feedback. 
As is common in laboratory experiments, this study’s external validity suffered in 
some ways in exchange for higher internal validity. Careful control allowed extraneous 
variables to be ruled out, but further research is needed to see if this effect occurs in real-
life situations. For instance, in the context of work or school, things like perceptions of 
the legitimacy of an evaluator’s authority or actual implications of feedback (i.e. not 
graduating, having to redo a task, loss of income) may influence responses to feedback as 
well. Also, participants in this experiment were all college students, which means that 
they were used to being evaluated in the context of their courses in the form of grades. 
This may predispose them to certain types of responses to feedback that might not be seen 
in populations that are not in college or have never attended college. On average, 
participants were college-aged, which may also affect the generalizability of results. 
There is evidence to suggest that the self-concept is more malleable (Demo, 1992) and 
people are more susceptible to persuasion (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989) at certain points in 
the lifespan. Additionally, self-perceptions were measured immediately after feedback, 
and so this study does not address the question of whether the effects of feedback and 
source reputation on self-perceptions last over time. Because half of the participants 
received negative feedback in what was intended to be a relatively important self-concept 
domain, it was necessary to limit the amount of time that they believed the feedback was 
true. Thus, participants were fully debriefed within 15 min of the feedback manipulation 
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in this study. However, future research might test the degree to which any effect of 
evaluator reputation on feedback acceptance persists. 
Measures were self-report, and so may have been influenced by perceived 
experimenter expectancies and social desirability concerns. Distractor questions were 
added to the self-perception measure to minimize this. Also, this measure of self-
perceived social awareness had to be constructed for this study because existing 
instruments did not measure the construct of interest. Although the measure was piloted 
and the most reliable items were used, the validity of the measure has not been 
established. However, in the interest of maintaining construct validity, it was necessary 
that the measure was worded in such a way that it corresponded to the social awareness 
task and the feedback participants received. 
Although further research is needed to understand why evaluator reputation affected 
feedback acceptance, results of this study suggest that people are more affected by 
feedback when they perceive their evaluator to be easy rather than hard. Findings may 
have implications for the fields of sports psychology, organizational psychology, and 
academics. Generally, it seems that if a coach, supervisor, or instructor wants feedback to 
be taken seriously, it would be beneficial to project the image of being a relatively easy 
evaluator. However, depending on the desired outcome, this could theoretically have a 
couple of different effects that are at odds with one another. Although feedback from the 
easy evaluator may be internalized more than feedback from the hard evaluator, 
perception of the evaluator as easy may detract from desired behaviors. For example, 
students who perceive their teacher to be easy may actually study less, spend less time on 
homework, and ultimately learn less than students with a teacher perceived as hard. 
To summarize, in this study the evaluator’s reputation as hard or easy influenced the 
degree to which feedback affected the feedback recipient’s self-perceptions. Specifically, 
feedback had a greater effect on participant self-perceptions when it came from an easy 
20 
evaluator than when it came from a hard evaluator. Further research is needed to explain 
why this effect may have occurred, but findings suggest that an evaluator’s reputation  
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